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We analyse a model of financial intermediation in which intermediaries are subject to moral hazard 
and they do not invest socially optimally, because they ignore the systemic costs of failure and, in 
the case of banks, because they fail to account for risks which are assumed by the deposit 
insurance fund. Capital adequacy requirements are designed to minimise the social costs of these 
effects. We show that banks should always have higher regulatory capital requirements than 
insurance companies. Contrary to received wisdom, when banks and insurance companies 
combine to form financial conglomerates we show that it is socially optimal to separate their balance 
sheets. Moreover, the practice of "regulatory arbitrage", or of transfering assets from one balance 
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This paper examines the optimal capital regulation of ﬁnancial conglomerates: institutions
which provide under a single corporate umbrella the provision of banking, insurance and other
ﬁnancial products.
The emergence of ﬁnancial conglomerates is one of the major ﬁnancial developments of recent
years. This has raised concerns amongst regulators about the appropriate measurement of capital
within a ﬁnancial group. In contrast, the existing theoretical academic literature about conglomer-
ates focuses on internal and industrial organisational issues, although an empirical study by Berger
et. al shows that conglomerated ﬁrms tend to take more risks. Our objective in this paper is to ﬁll a
gap in the literature by analysing optimal capital adequacy regulations for ﬁnancial conglomerates.
Several issues arise in the context of conglomerate regulation. Firstly, should the conglomerate
be structured as a unique entity, or should its various divisions be allowed to fail independently?
In the former case, capital requirements will be determined on a centralised basis for the entire
conglomerate, while in the latter, the regulator can set decentralised capital requirements for each
of the conglomerate’s divisions. Secondly, when capital is computed on a decentralised basis, how
should the regulator respond to the existence of regulatory arbitrage, under which conglomerate
assets are held in the division where they will attract the lowest regulatory capital charge? At this
point it should be emphasized that our contribution does not deal with loss transferts from one
division to another, a practice that allows the solvent division of a holding to dump its bad assets
on a division that is close to failure. This is a practice that is usually forbidden by regulators (as for
instance in regulation W implementing the Federal Reserve Act Sections 23A/23B). The diﬀerence
with regulatory arbitrage is that in this case the allocation of assets to the division is made ex ante,
while in the case of loss transferts it is done ex post.
Capital regulations are currently computed on a decentralised basis. This encourages regulatory
arbitrage, which has been identiﬁed by both practitioners and regulators as evidence of undesirable
inconsistencies in the treatment of ﬁnancial assets. It has been argued that a centralised system
with a unique capital requirement would resolve these inconsistencies and that, by enforcing cross-
division warranties against failure, it would reap additional diversiﬁcation beneﬁts and reduce
bankruptcy risk.
We analyse these questions using a model in which the role of capital requirements is to force
shareholders (and hence managers) to internalise eﬀects which are not adequately priced. The
speciﬁce ﬀects which concern us in this paper are a social cost of bankruptcy and the existence of a
deposit insurance safety net for banks, both of which result in overinvestment relative to the social
optimum. We assume that capital is exogenously costly as a result of informational frictions of
the type considered by blah, and hence that capital requirements will cause some underinvestment
in marginal projects. The optimal capital regulation trades oﬀ these under- and over-investment
eﬀects.
We examine two division conglomerates consisting of a bank and an insurance company. Two
features distinguish the bank from the insurance company. Firstly, only the bank has access to the
deposit insurance net; and secondly, the bank has monopoly access to positive net present value
projects, while the insurance company must compete in an eﬃcient marketplace for the right to
invest in its projects. Since the insurance company does not have access to the deposit insurance
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net it follows immediately that its standalone capital requirements will be lower than the bank’s.
We consider in turn decentralised and centralised structures. In a decentralised conglomerate
capital arbitrage will occur to transfer assets to the division which has the lowest capital charges.
By increasing the capital charge of the bank suﬃciently, the regulator can induce it to transfer
all of its assets to the insurance company. This has three consequences. Firstly, the investment
distortions induced by the deposit insurance fund will no longer occur. Secondly, marginal projects
in which the standalone bank would not invest will now attract funds, because of the lower capital.
Thirdly, the bank will as a result of the arbitrage have only safe cash assets. Regulatory arbitrage
therefore reduces the extent of the safety net and, by allowing for a more eﬃcient use of capital,
r e s u l t si nag r e a t e rd e g r e eo fb a n kc r e d i te x t e n s i o n .
Under a centralised structure, the various operating units of the conglomerate are compelled
to bail one another out. Losses in one division may therefore be covered by proﬁts in another.
However, it is also true that the failure of one division may result in the insolvency of the entire
conglomerate. Thus, centralisation may open new channels for ﬁnancial contagion. In particular,
the costs of insurance company failure may be borne by the deposit insurance fund. We show
that, for a given regulatory capital requirement, the lending decisions of the bank will depend
upon the fragililty of the insurance company. When the insurance company is relatively low risk
the diversiﬁcation eﬀect dominates and the value of the bank’s deposit insurance safety net is
decreased. As a result the bank is less willing to lend to riskier projects. In contrast, when the
insurance company is riskier the contagion eﬀect dominates and the bank therefore extracts a higher
expected payment from the deposit insurance safety net. This renders it more willing to lend. We
therefore show that centralised conglomerates have an amplifying eﬀect: that is, the bank invests
in more risky projects precisely when the insurance company is facing more risk.
We conclude from the above discussion that, contrary to the majority view, decentralised con-
glomerates allow for a more eﬃcient allocation of resources than centralised ones. Moreover, the
ampliﬁcation eﬀect which we have identiﬁed in centralised conglomerates gives rise to systemic
concerns which do not arise in decentralised conglomerates.
1. Stand-alone Capital Requirements
1.1. The Model
In this section we introduce our basic modelling approach and use it to consider the optimal
capital requirements for standalone bank and insurance companies. In later sections we consider
the capital regulation of conglomerates which contain both banks and insurance companies. Our
modelling approach is similar to Lóránth and Morrison (2003), extended to include a systemic cost
of institutional insolvency.
The ﬁnancial institutions in our model are risk neutral proﬁt maximisers which collect funds
from depositors and policy-holders and invest them on their behalf. We assume that bank depos-
itors are protected by deposit insurance and that policy-holders are not. In this model we ignore
payments which the banker makes into a deposit insurance scheme; in such schemes the banker is
charged for the average rather than the marginal cost of his moral hazard and these schemes cannot
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entirely resolve the allocative problems which we identify. In the interests of brevity, we will refer
to depositors and policy-holders collectively as “investors”.
The model for both banks and insurance companies is identical. At time t0,n a t u r ep r e s e n t s
the ﬁnancial institution with an investment project (B,R) which is drawn from the region A ≡
©
(B,R) ∈ <2 : Rl ≤ R ≤ Rh,0 ≤ B ≤ R
ª
with measure A, according to the uniform distribution.
The project requires a time 1 investment of 1 and at time t2 returns R + B or R − B, each with
probability 0.5.
At time t1 the bank decides whether or not to invest in the project; if it does so then it raises
1 − C from investors and C as equity capital. The capital requirement C is stipulated by the
regulator. We assume that there is an exogenous cost κ per unit of capital which the bank deploys.
This is intended to reﬂect a lemons problem in the capital markets (see Myers and Majluf, 1984;
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Froot and Stein, 1998; and Bolton and Freixas, 2000) and κ
is therefore a wealth transfer whose only eﬀect upon the welfare calculations in our paper will be
through the investment distortions which is causes.
Capital in our model is a real cushion of external equity which will bear losses. We therefore
assume that cross holdings, multiple gearing and downstreaming are excluded from the capital
computation according to the standard consolidation rules. In the context of our model, the
structure of the capital as tier 1 or tier 2 is irrelevant insofar as it has an informational cost.
Returns from the project are realised at time t2 and are distributed to the various providers of
funds.
As it is well known, ﬁnancial institution insolvency has a social cost. We assume that this
is equal to 2φ for both banks and insurance companies and that it is a pure externality so that
ﬁnancial institutions will fail to account for it in their calculations.
1.2. Banker Investment Decisions
In this section we analyse the incentives to which the banker is subject and we discuss the optimal
capital adequacy response to them.
In the social optimum the banker invests in any project which has positive NPV, after accounting
for the social costs of failure. To analyse these projects, we deﬁne S ≡ {(B,R) ∈ A : R − B<1 − C}
to be the set of speculative projects and P ≡ A\S to be the set of prudent projects and we refer
to a bank as speculative or prudent according to its project type. Speculative projects will with
probability 0.5 become insolvent and incur a social cost of 2φ; prudent projects will not. The ﬁrst
best investment rule is therefore to invest whenever R ≥ σ(B),w h e r e
σ (B) ≡
(
1, (B,R) ∈ P;
1+φ, (B,R) ∈ S.
(1)
The banker will not adopt this investment rule for two reasons: ﬁrstly, because he does not
bear the systemic cost 2φ; and secondly, because depositors are protected by deposit insurance.
The deposit insurance cost will cover losses sustained by depositors if the bank becomes insolvent:
this is relevant precisely when the bank is speculative, and in this case the deposit insurance fund
will make a payment of 1 − C − (R − B) if the project fails. The eﬀects of deposit insurance are
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well understood (see for example Merton, 1977): because depositors do not fully internalise the
riskiness of speculative projects, they do not demand compensation for it. The bank’s shareholders




[(1 − C) − (R − B)].
To derive the banker’s investment rule, note that with a capital requirement of C the cost
of investing in project (B,R) is 1+Cκ.W h e n (B,R) is prudent the bank’s shareholders will
experience all of the proﬁts and losses associated with the project and they will therefore price
them correctly. This yields the following hurdle rate for prudent projects:
HP
B (B) ≡ 1+Cκ.( 2 )
When (B,R) is speculative the bank’s shareholders will in addition receive a wealth transfer D from
the deposit insurance fund. They will therefore invest in any project for which R ≥ 1+Cκ − D,
which yields the following hurdle rate for speculative projects:1
HS
B (B) ≡ 1 − B + C (1 + 2κ).( 3 )
We deﬁne the hurdle rate function HB (B) to be HP
B (B) for prudent projects and to be HS
B (B)
for speculative projects.
The discussion so far is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. Nature selects the project from the region A,w i t h
border A1A2A3A4A1. Prudent projects are separated from speculative projects by the line P1P2.
The bank’s hurdle rate is given by the line U1U2O1: U1U2 is the locus of HP (B) in P and U2O1 is
the locus of HS (B) in S.T h es o c i a l l yﬁr s tb e s tp o l i c yi st oa c c e p tp r o j e c t sf o rw h i c hR ≥ σ (B).
The discrepancy between the banker’s objective function and that of society is represented by the
shaded areas U and O. These represent respectively the banker’s under- and over- investment
relative to the social optimum.
The banker’s deviation from the social optimum can be explained as follows. He will overinvest
in speculative projects for two reasons: because the deposit insurance fund renders him insuﬃciently
sensitive to the risks assumed by his depositors, and because he will ignore the expected social cost
φ associated with speculative projects. Prudent projects do not result in insolvency and hence are
not subject to these distortions. The banker will however include in his calculations the transfer cost
Cκ of capital which does not appear in the social welfare function. He will therefore underinvest
in prudent projects. Distortions of the type which we identify here have been observed in the wake
of the ﬁrst Basle Accord on bank capital (Furﬁne et. al, 1999).
To understand better the relative contributions of the systemic cost φ of insolvency and the
incentive eﬀects of the deposit insurance safety net to the ineﬃciencies identiﬁed here, consider
ﬁgure 2, which deﬁnes new regions O0, ΣU and ΣO.D e ﬁne in addition the region U0 ≡ U ∪ ΣU.
Then U0 and O0 represent the respective under- and over- investment regions when there is no
1The hurdle rates can be derived directly. The expected shareholder payoﬀ from prudent investments is R−1−Cκ
and from speculative projects is
1

































Figure 1: Investment decisions of a stand alone bank in response to a capital requirement
C. The banker will invest in projects in the region A1A2O1U2U1A1.T h es o c i a l l yﬁrst best policy
is to invest in the region A1A2O3U4U5U6A1. The regions U and O represent over- and under-
investment, respectively.
systemic cost of bank failure (so that φ =0and σ (B) ≡ 1). The total expected welfare generated



















where A is the area of the region A from which nature selects the project. When φ is non-zero, the

















σ(B) − R.dRdB.( 4 )
The following proposition, which is proved in the appendix, identiﬁes the eﬀect upon welfare of
t h es y s t e m i cc o s tφ:










Σ U Σ O
O0
Figure 2: Deﬁnitions of sub-regions in A.
Proposition 1 Let WB
0 and W Bbe the welfare generated by a standalone bank in the respective
















σ(B) − 1.dRdB.( 6 )
Proposition 1 states that SB (C) is a measure of the systemic risk associated with a standalone
bank which has capital requirement C . It is obvious from inspection of ﬁgure 1 that S0
B (C) < 0;
moreover, since when C =1 , σ(B) ≡ 1 within A, SB (1) = 0. Systemic risk in our model therefore
arises when banks have fractional capital requirements and is diminishing in their capital level.
The regulator sets the capital requirement Cs∗
B for a standalone bank to minimise the combined
eﬀect of the distortion caused by systemic costs of failure and deposit insurance incentive eﬀects.
Proposition 2, which is proved in the appendix, guarantees that 0 <C s∗
B < 1:
Proposition 2 The optimal capital requirement for a standalone bank lies between 0 and 1 and is
increasing in the magnitude of the systemic cost 2φ of insolvency and decreasing in κ.
1.3. Insurer Investment Decisions
The only diﬀerence in our model between an insurance company and a bank is that the former has
no deposit insurance, and the latter does. Speculative insurance companies still incur an expected
systemic cost of φ and their ﬁrst best investment rule is to accept investments whenever R ≥ σ (B),
where σ(B) is deﬁned by equation 1.
Since the policy holders are not insured they will internalise the risks which the insurer takes for
both speculative and prudent projects. Since the systemic cost 2φ is an externality the insurer and
6REGULATION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES
the insured will ignore it and the hurlde rate for the standalone insurance company will therefore
be
HI (B) ≡ 1+Cκ.
The insurance company’s investment decision is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. As in the bank case, the
insurance company should invest in all projects for which R ≥ σ(B). However, the insurer will
invest in projects for which R ≥ 1+Cκ.W h e nCκ < φ as shown (this will trivially always be the
case for an optimal capital requirement), both under and over investment occur: projects in region



















Figure 3: Insurance company investment decisions in response to a capital requirement
C.
As in section 1.2, we examine the diﬀerence between welfare levels with and without systemic
costs of bank failure. Deﬁne WI
0 and WI as follows to be the expected welfare generated by the



































σ (B) − R.dRdB. (8)
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Proposition 3 provides an expression for the diﬀerence between WI
0 and WI:
Proposition 3 Let WI
0 be the expected welfare generated by a standalone insurance company’s
investments in the absence of systemic costs of insolvency, and WI be the corresponding ﬁgure








σ(B) − 1.dRdB. (9)
Proposition 3 is entirely analogous to proposition 1 and we make the following deﬁnition by







σ(B) − 1.dRdB.( 1 0 )
SI (C) i sam e a s u r eo ft h es y s t e m i cr i s ka s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h es t a n d a l o n ei n s u r a n c ec o m p a n y .SI
is decreasing in C with SI (1) = 0.
Since policy-holders in standalone insurance companies do not have access to a deposit insurance
safety net, the optimal capital requirement for a standalone insurance company in the absence of
systemic risk is 0. This provides the intuition for the following result, which we prove in the
appendix.
Proposition 4 The optimal capital requirement for a standalone insurance company lies strictly
between 0 and 1 and is strictly less than the optimal capital requirement for a standalone bank.
Proposition 4 is contrary to the frequently advanced practitioner belief that banks and insurance
companies should be subject to the same prudential capital requirements. As banks and insurance
companies increasingly invest in the same assets internally calculated capital requirements, com-
monly referred to as “economic capital”, are similar for both institutions. Practitioners argue that
there is therefore no justiﬁcation for diﬀering regulatory capital requirements.
This argument does not hold water in the context of our model, even though we assume that
banks and insurance companies have access to an identical universe of investments. In our model the
only role of capital requirements is the correction of externalities, which are by deﬁnition ignored in
economic capital calculations. Since banks, whose debt-holders are protected by deposit insurance,
inﬂict greater externalities upon society than insurance companies, whose policy-holders are not,
they should inevitably be subject to more stringent capital regulation.
The simplicity of our approach allow us to extend the analysis to cope with alternative assump-
tions. Thus, the extension to diﬀerent social costs for banks and insurance is straightforward. Also,
conﬂicts of interest between managers and shareholders where managers care about their reputation
can also be dealt with and yield intuitive results.
2. Capital Regulation of Financial Conglomerates
I nt h i ss e c t i o nw ec o n s i d e rt h er e g u l a t i o no fﬁnancial conglomerates. We deﬁne a ﬁnancial con-
glomerate to be a corporation which consists of a bank and an insurance company and we will refer
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to the individual business units (banks and insurance companies) of the conglomerate as divisions.
We examine two liability structures for ﬁnancial conglomerates as follows:
Decentralised conglomerates consist of two divisions operating as standalone businesses under
a single holding company umbrella. The divisions in a decentralised conglomerate can fail inde-
pendently of one another, so that cross-division bail outs are not necessary and, in our simple
one-period model, will not occur.2
Centralised conglomerates have consolidated balance sheets so that their divisions operate us-
ing the same capital base. An inevitable consequence of this is that the various divisions of the
corporation are compelled to bail one another out.
The choice between decentralised and centralised conglomerates is driven by three factors.
Firstly, by compelling cross-division bail outs, centralisation introduces risk diversiﬁcation which
serves to reduce the potential systemic costs of failure. This eﬀect will not obtain in decentralised
conglomerates in which cross-division bail outs will not occur.
Secondly, centralisation may also result in ﬁnancial contagion: this occurs when one division
experiences losses so severe that the other division also fails, even though it is on a standalone
basis proﬁtable. For non zero costs φ of ﬁnancial institution insolvency this latter eﬀect will reduce
social welfare. Decentralised conglomerates have “ﬁrewalls” between their divisions which prevent
ﬁnancial contagion from occuring.
Finally, because each of the divisions of a decentralised conglomerate has its own balance sheet it
is possible for assets to be transferred from one division to another. In practice this is typically done
to avoid regulatory capital charges and it is often referred to as “regulatory arbitrage.” Regulators
sometimes argue that regulatory arbitrage enables bankers to bend capital adequacy rules and
hence that it is welfare reductive. We demonstrate below that, on the contrary, it allows assets to
be held where they will minimise social externalities and hence that it is welfare enhancing.
In the following sections we consider the optimal capital regulation of decentralised and cen-
tralised conglomerates.
2.1. Decentralised Conglomerates
To examine the optimal capital regulation of decentralised ﬁnancial conglomerates, we extend the
model of section 1 as follows. At time t0 nature presents the bank and the insurance company with
an investment opportunity, each of which is drawn independently from the distribution described in
section 1. At time t1 the bank and the insurance companies decide whether to invest in the projects.
At time t2 they have an opportunity costlessly to trade their projects, using the mechanism outlined
below. At time t3 (after trade has occurred) the conglomerate’s divisions raise capital and other
funds for investment as above. Capital requirements for the bank are set at CB and for the insurance
company at CI.A tt i m et4 returns are realised from the project.
The time t2 trading allows the bank and insurance divisions to exchange projects. Since capital
charges are determined at time t3 trading allows the divisions to decide for themselves the regime
2In a multi period model divisions may sometimes elect to bail one another out to maintain charter value or
reputation (see Boot and Thakor, 1993, for a discussion of related issues). These factors are not externalities and so
including them in our model would merely complicate it without aﬀecting the essential intuition.
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under which the projects will be assessed for capital adequacy regulation. The key point is that
trade will enable projects to be accepted when they would have been rejected by a standalone
ﬁnancial institution. As we are concerned only with the aggregate social return on investment the
precise rules under which trade occurs are not important for our results. For convenience we will
assume that at time t2 one division can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the other for its project.
This trading rule ensures that a project will be accepted provided its expected returns exceeds
either of the divisions’ hurdle rate. After time t3 trade the project will be retained by the division

























Figure 4: Over- and under- investment regions for decentralised ﬁnancial conglomerates.
The situation described here is illustrated in ﬁgure 4. With trade as described in the previous
paragraph, both divisions will accept any project whose expected return exceeds the hurdle rate
min(HB,H I): this implies that all investments in the region A1A2I1I2I3A1 will be accepted. HI <
HB for precisely those investments which lie to the left of I2 and these will therefore be held in
the insurance company’s portfolio; investments to the right of I2 will be held in the bank portfolio.
The consequence of time t2 trade is therefore that the bank retains the riskiest investments and
that the others are passed to the insurance company.
The socially ﬁr s tb e s ti n v e s t m e n tp o l i c yf o rt h ei n s u r a n c ec o m p a n yi st oa c c e p ta l li n v e s t m e n t s
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which lie above the line W1W2W3W4. The region UI therefore represents insurance company
underinvestment, while the region OI represents insurance company overinvestment. Likewise, the
social optimum is for the bank to accept investments which lie above the line W1V2V3W4 so the
region OB ∪O represents bank overinvestment. The regulator must select the capital requirements
CI and CB for the bank and the insurance company respectively so as to minimise the social cost
associated with these regions.
To understand how optimal capital requirements should be set, consider the eﬀect of increasing
the bank’s capital requirement CB. This would would raise the bank’s hurdle rate thus moving the
intersection point I1 up the line R = B. Although some investments in region O w o u l dt h e nf a l l
below the bank’s hurdle rate, they would continue to lie above the insurance company’s hurdle and
hence would continue to be accepted by both divisions. In other words, the eﬀect on the left side is
nil, while the eﬀe c to nt h er i g h ts i d ei sp o s i t i v e .T h eo n l ye ﬀect upon investment behaviour of an
increase in CB would therefore be to diminish the size of the region OB a n dw i t hi tt h ea s s o c i a t e d
investment distortions. It follows that the optimal regulatory policy would be to set the bank’s
capital requirement so high that the area OB was empty. This is trivially higher than the stand
alone bank capital requirement.
With CB set so as to empty OB, the only remaining investment distortions are the under
investment region UI and the overinvestment region OI ∪O. This is the identical situation to that
illustrated in ﬁgure 3: in other words, when CB is set so as to render OB empty, the social eﬀect of
both divisions’ investment decisions is the same as that of a standalone insurance company’s. The
optimal capital requirement CI for the insurance division is therefore the same as that of a stand
alone insurance company.
We summarise the discussion so far in proposition 5.
Proposition 5 The optimal capital requirement C∗d
I for the insurance division of a decentralised
conglomerate is equal to the optimal capital requirement for a standalone insurance company. Any
capital level in excess of
1+2C∗d
I
1+2κ is optimal for the bank division.
Proof. The above discussion demonstrates that C∗d
I is optimal for the insurance division and
that any capital requirement which renders OB empty when the insurance division has capital
requirement C∗d
I is optimal for the bank division. The point I1 lies where R =1−B+CB (1 + 2κ)
intersects R = B, or where R = 1
2 {1+CB (1 + 2κ)}. OB is empty provided this exceeds 1+C∗d
I ,
or when CB ≥
1+2C∗d
I
1+2κ as required. 2
To appreciate why proposition 5 must be true, recall that capital requirements are set to correct
as well as possible for the externalities which the ﬁnancial institution will not account for when
selecting its investments. These comprise a systemic cost for the insurance company, and a deposit
insurance cost and a systemic cost for the bank. Since only the bank imposes a risk shifting
externality upon society it is sensible to set capital requirements at such a level that the deposit
insurance fund is not called upon. In this case both divisions will accept precisely those investments
which the insurance company would accept on a stand alone basis. Capital requirements for the
insurance company must therefore be set at the optimal stand alone level.
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Corollary 6
1. Optimal capital requirements for the bank division of a decentralised conglomerate are higher
than those for a standalone bank;
2. Optimal capital requirements for the bank division of a decentralised conglomerate are to be
set at a higher level than those for the insurance division.
3. The expected social welfare generated by a decentralised conglomerate with optimal capi-
tal requirements exceeds the expected sum of welfares of a standalone bank and insurance
company;
4. Regulatory arbitrage is welfare increasing. Restrictions upon regulatory arbitrage cause an
ineﬃcient drop in the supply of credit.
Proof. The ﬁrst statement is a trivial consequence of the above discussion and the second follows
immediately from the ﬁrst. The third statement follows from the observations that the expected
social welfare generated by a standalone insurance company exceeds that of a standalone bank and
that conglomeration with optimal capital requirements guarantees that the bank accepts the same
investments as a standalone insurance company. The welfare increase identiﬁed in part 3 of the
proposition occurs precisely because of the time t2 trading, from which part 4 follows immediately.
2
The statements in the above corollary contradict received regulatory wisdom. The standard
argument is that regulatory arbitrage allows insurance companies to dump low quality assets on the
bank’s balance sheet and that this is welfare reductive. While this is true for suboptimal capital
requirements (in which case O is non-empty and the insurance company accepts investments in
this region and then dumps them on the bank), it is incorrect when capital requirements are set
optimally. With optimal capital requirements the bank’s deposit insurance net is valueless. In this
case the insurance company will never dump poor quality assets on the bank. The bank’s capital
requirements then serve precisely as a disincentive to asset retention; after originating assets it
simply passes them onto the insurance company. In other words, capital requirements are set so as
to encourage regulatory arbitrage.
Note that, unless CB =1 , I2 will lie strictly within A and after regulatory arbitrage the bank
will retain all investments which lie to the right of this point. In other words, the bank’s portfolio
in the presence of regulatory arbitrage will be signiﬁcantly riskier than the insurance company’s.
With optimal capital requirements this is evidence of the eﬃcient use of capital, and not of excessive
risk-taking incentives.
2.2. Optimal Capital Regulation for Centralised Conglomerates
Our set up provides the tools to analyse the behaviour of a centralised conglomerate and its impli-
cations for capital regulation. This follows closely Gyongyi and Morrison (2004).
To simplify the analysis we assume that the insurance company is ﬁrst to select a project. The
bank will then select a project knowing the risks it inherits from the insurance company project.
This means that at times one division’s proﬁt will allow the whole conglomerate to break even,
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which is the diversiﬁcation argument, and at other times one division’s losses will cause the whole
conglomerate to go under.
A second simpliﬁcation will be brought in concerning the independence of the two divisions.
We will assume, not only that the insurance company investment does not alter the set of possible
investments A of the bank, but also that the two projects returns are independent. This means
that the case we focus on is the one where there are neither economies of scope nor economies of
scale.
We denote the projects selected by the insurance company and the bank by (BI,RI) and
(BB,RB) respectively. This allow us to deﬁne four diﬀerent cases depending on the realisations
of the two projects.
Denoting outcomes by ordered pairs in which the bank’s result (S for solvency and F for failure)
appear ﬁrst, the payoﬀ from each outcome is as follows.
VSS ≡ RI + BI − 1+RB + BB − 1+CB;( 1 1 )
VSF ≡ RI + BI − 1+RB − BB − 1+CB (12)
VFS ≡ RI − BI − 1 − RB + BB − 1+CB (13)
VFF ≡ RI − BI − 1 − RB − BB − 1+CB (14)
Shareholders’ payoﬀs will be given by V +
SF =m a x ( VSF,0),V+
FS =m a x ( VFS,0),V+
FF = max(VFF,0)






SS + V +
SF + V +
FS + V +
FF
¤
− CIk + CB (1 + κ).( 1 5 )
Depending on the two selected investment projects, the conglomerate may fail or may not fail.
This will depend on whether VFF is strictly positive.
In the same way we deﬁne prudent projects for the standalone bank, we will now characterize
a safe (centralised) conglomerate by the following condition: VFF ≥ 0
Regarding the cases where the conglomerate might fail, we are able to distinguish four cases,
which are illustrated in Figure 4.
First when VFS > 0 and VSF > 0,o n eﬁnancial entity rescues the other. The diversiﬁcation
of the assets allows the conglomerate to survive provided one of the two ﬁnancial institutions is
succesful. We will refer to this case as the diversiﬁed case.
Second, when VFS > 0 and VSF < 0 the conglomerate result is driven by what happens at the
bank level. Third, symetrically when VFS < 0 and VSF > 0, the insurance company results are the
only ones that matter for the conglomerate solvency.
Finallly, the fourth case is the one where VFS < 0 and VSF < 0, where one failure is enough to
trigger the conglomerate failure. This we interpret as the contagious case.
The analysis here follows closely Loranth and Morrison(2004).
First it is shown that the insurance company project choice aﬀects the investment behaviour
of the bank, while this would not happen in the decentralised case. This is the case because
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depending on the choice of (BI,R I) the diﬀerent areas in ﬁgure 4 will change. In particular, if the
insurance company choice is prudent, this decreases the value of the deposit insurance put option
and therefore the bank tends to underinvest. Conversely, if the insurance company is speculative,
this increase in riskiness BI increases the value of the deposit insurance put option3.
Second, diversiﬁcation reduces the value of the deposit insurance net. As a consequence the
capital requirement for a bank within a centralised ﬁnancial conglomerate will be lower than the
one for a standalone bank. Yet, since the insurance will now beneﬁt from the deposit insurance
of the bank division, its capital requirements will have to be set at a higher level than for the
standalone insurance company.
Finally, decentralised ﬁnancial conglomerates constitute a more eﬃcient form of conglomerate
for the optimal capital requirements. This is the case as the distortive eﬀect of deposit insurance
is fully eliminated in the decentralised conglomerates while they are not in the centralised ones.
3. Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to consider simultaneously a rationale for the existence of
capital requirements and the issue of capital regulation. This perspective allow us to characterize
the optimal levels of capital for a conglomerate. We think this is worthwhile because the fact that
a ﬁnancial conglomerate is able to decrease its capital burden through regulatory arbitrage is not,
per se, ineﬃcient.
We show that, on the contrary, once we take into account the diﬀerent distortions, regulatory
arbitrage leads to allocating the asset to the division that bears the lowest cost of funds and, if
capital coeﬃcients are set correctly, this is eﬃcient.
The result is in stark contrast with the argument often made that capital requirements should
be set at the same level. The fact that banks are funded through deposits at a ﬂat risk premium
will adds an additional distorition to the ones existing because of the cost of raising capital that is
borne by any ﬁnancial institution.
Our model allow us also to compare the centralised, i.e.with consolidated limited liability, and
decentralised ﬁnancial conglomerates where each division has limited liability and to show that
decentralised ﬁnancial conglomerates may represent a better choice from the eﬃciency point of
view.
4. Appendix
4 . 1 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
Observe that
3An interesting implication of our analysis is that the response of investment behaviour to the business cycle is
not the same for a decentralised and for a centralised conglomerate..
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where the second line follows from equation 16.
4 . 2 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Deﬁne ∆(C) to be the total investment distortion caused by deposit insurance in the absence of



















[1 − C (1 + 2κ)]
3 . (17)
Proof. There are two cases to consider, according to whether C (1 + 2κ) is less than or greater than
1. The former is illustrated in ﬁgure 1; in the latter, which is illustrated in ﬁgure 6, region OO
vanishes.
Case 1: C(1 + 2κ)≤ 1. This is the case which is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. UO is comprised
of a rectangular area and a right angled triangle bounded below by R =1and above by R =
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Figure 6: Region UO when C (1 + 2κ) > 1.
Case 2: C(1 + 2κ)> 1. This case is illustrated in ﬁgure 6. In this case region OO vanishes and
region UO is the region with the bold outline, with the shaded area removed. α(C) can therefore
be obtained by subtracting the welfare which could be attained by investing in shaded area projects
from that attained by investing in all projects in the bold outline. The welfare from projects in the











(1 − C (1 + 2κ))
3 ,
from which the required result follows immediately. 2
To prove the proposition, note that









B (1) ≤ 0 with S0
B (1) = 0, so that the aggregate distortion is decreasing in C when C =0and
increasing when C =1 . It follows that the optimal capital requirement is strictly between 0 and 1.
That the optimal capital requirement is increasing in φ follows immediately from the observation
that ∂SB
∂φ > 0.
4 . 3 .P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
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Using equation 7 this reduces to
W = W0 −
ZZ
O




σ(B) − 1.dRdB −
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σ (B) − 1.dRdB.
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